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I INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
After endorsing the 2011 ‘Guiding Principles for Business and Human 
Rights’,1 the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a 
press release announcing that  
in an unprecedented step, the United Nations Human Rights Council has 
endorsed a new set of Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights 
designed to provide — for the first time — a global standard for preventing 
and addressing the risk of adverse impacts on human rights linked to 
business activity.2  
While such a categorisation may be debatable,3 there remains little 
disagreement over the importance of such an endorsement by the UN Human 
Rights Council. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business 
and Human Rights (hereinafter SRSG), Professor John Ruggie, declared that 
‘[t]he Council’s endorsement establishes the Guiding Principles as the 
authoritative global reference point for business and human rights’.4 This was 
reinforced by the incorporation of the Guiding Principles and the ‘Protect, 
Respect and Remedy’ framework in the 2011 update of the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises.5 However, in order to fully understand the 
importance as well as the novelty of the framework, it is imperative to 
understand the drafting history leading to this seminal outcome for corporate 
human rights and particularly the initiative which was the basis for the 
establishment of the mandate of the SRSG.6   
                                                 
1 These are the guiding principles for states and transnational corporations and other business 
entities on the implementation of Ruggie’s ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework. 
2 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘New Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights Endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council’ (Media Release 16 
June 2011) [italics added]; for the full text of the Guiding Principles, see United Nations 
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
Iissue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, 
John Ruggie Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, 17th sess, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc 
A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011); United Nations Human Rights Council, Resolution Adopted 
by the Human Rights Council: Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises, 17th sess, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4 (6 July 2011). 
3 See below Part 2 of this article for a discussion of previous standards of business and human 
rights relations. 
4 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 2. 
5 Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, ‘OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises — 2011 Edition’ (Guidelines, OECD 25 May 2011) ch IV. 
6 John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda’ 
(2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 819, 821. 
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In 1998 the Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of 
Transnational Corporations was established by a Sub-Commission of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights.7 Its mandate was to make recommendations 
and proposals concerning the working methods and activities of transnational 
corporations (TNCs), in order to ensure that these correlate with the economic 
and social objectives of their host countries and promote human rights.8 The 
final detailed document, and its commentary, were approved in August 2003 
by the Sub-Commission. The document was named the Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (hereinafter Norms).9 The Norms 
                                                 
7 Jakob Ragnwaldh and Paola Konopik, ‘The UN Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ in 
Ramon Mullerat (ed), Corporate Social Responsibility: The Corporate Governance of the 
21st Century (Kluwer Law International 2005) 251–2; Dinah Shelton, ‘Protecting Human 
Rights in a Globalized World’ (2002) 25 Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review 273, 284. The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities was renamed in 1999 to be named the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, ‘Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights — Final Report 
of the 58th session' UN GAOR, 58th sess, UN Doc A/HRC/Sub.1/58/36, (11 September 2006).  
8 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The 
Relationship Between the Enjoyment of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Right 
to Development, and the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational Corporations, 
ESCOR, 50th sess, 26th mtg, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/45(20 August 1998) [4(d)]. During 
the subsequent years, the mandate of the working group was expanded several times. In 2001 
the mandate was extended for another three years, and the authority to compile a list of human 
rights instruments and norms pertaining to transnational corporations was included. Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, The Effects of the Working 
Methods and Activities of Transnational Corporations on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, 
ESCOR, 53rd sess, 25th mtg, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/40 (15 August 2001).  
9 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard 
to Human Rights, UN ESCOR, 55th sess, 22nd mtg, Agenda Item 4, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (13 August 2003); Carolin F Hillemanns, ‘UN Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights’ (2003) 4 German Law Journal 1065, 1071; David Weissbrodt and Muria 
Kruger, ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 
901, 901–15; Larry Catá Backer, ‘Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United 
Nation’s Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as Harbinger of 
Corporate Responsibility in International Law’ (2006) 37 Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review 287, 287; Ruggie, above n 6, 820; David Kinley and Rachel Chambers, ‘The UN 
Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public International Law’ 
(2006) 6(3) Human Rights Law Review 447, 467–8; Olga Martin-Ortega, ‘Business and 
Human Rights in Conflict’ (2008) 22(3) Ethics & International Affairs 273, 280–1; Troy 
Rule, ‘Using Norms to Change International Law: UN Human Rights Laws Sneaking in 
through the Back Door’ (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law 325, 328. 
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were far-reaching and included a duty for TNCs10 to impose human rights 
obligations upon states, even if states failed to ratify the human rights 
instruments establishing these duties.11  
The draft Norms represented a significant departure from the prevailing 
practice among international organisations when dealing with the often 
difficult relationship between business and human rights: that of voluntary 
compliance.12 The Norms were designed to constitute a ‘non-voluntary’, 
comprehensive framework, creating direct obligations for TNCs and 
supplemented by a rigid enforcement mechanism including the monitoring by 
non-state actors (NGOs and TNCs themselves). The document was prepared 
in accordance with the mandate that the Working Group received and was in 
line with the background reports upon which it was supposed to structure its 
work. Many scholars hailed the document as the groundbreaking initiative 
that might succeed, for the first time, in ending corporate abuses of human 
rights.13  
Such explicit support for the Norms was accompanied by often fierce 
opposition from various states and the majority of the business community. 
                                                 
10 The term TNCs in this chapter relates also to other business enterprises, unless it is expressly 
stated otherwise. This term will be used interchangeably with the terms MNCs (multinational 
corporations) and MNEs (multinational enterprises).  
11 Backer, above n 9, 371–80; Ruggie, above n 6, 825–6; Kinley and Chambers, above n 9, 452. 
12 Such approaches were prevalent within the UN Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational 
Corporations (UNCTC, Transnational Corporations, Services and the Uruguay Round 
(United Nations, 1990) 231–43 (see particularly art 4)); the International Labour Organization 
in the Tripartite Declaration (International Labour Organization, ‘Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (MNE Declaration)’(ILO, 
1977); International Labour Organization, ‘Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (MNE Declaration) — 3rd Edition’, ILO, 1 
January 2000); International Labour Organisation, ‘Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (MNE Declaration) — 4th 
Edition’(ILO, 1 January 2006); as well as in the OECD in its Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (Joachim Karl, ‘The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ in Michael 
K Addo (ed), Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999) 98–106; Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (Guidelines, OECD, 27 June 
2000); OECD, above n 5.  
13 See Surya Deva, ‘UN’s Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction’ (2004) 10 ILSA Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 493, 497; Julie Campagna, ‘United Nations Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights: The International Community Asserts Binding Law on the Global Rule 
Makers’ (2004) 37 John Marshall Law Review 1205, 1205–52; Hillemanns, above n 9, 1065; 
Weissbrodt and Kruger, above n 9; David Weissbrodt, ‘Business and Human Rights’ (2005) 
74 University of Cincinnati Law Review 55, 55. 
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Such opposition arose from the moment the Norms were formally introduced 
as a discussion paper after their approval by the Sub-Commission.14 Most 
states expressed strong reservations, emphasising their determination not to 
depart from the traditional framework of international law, which stresses the 
central and pivotal role of the state as a legal subject of public international 
law.  
The Norms were eventually abandoned in 2005 and the task of regulating 
transnational corporate accountability was transferred to other UN organs.15 
This article discusses possible reasons why the Norms failed to be approved 
by the UN Commission on Human Rights. This discussion is necessary to 
help us understand the difficulties involved in creating ‘hard law’ obligations 
governing TNCs with regard to human rights within the wider framework of 
international law. It is crucial to understand the possible motives as well as the 
underlying rationale which led first to the adoption and then the rapid 
abandoning of the Norms. The discussion will also shed light on the future of 
indirect, vague voluntarism, as well as on our prospects of finding alternative 
solutions to the problems addressed by the Norms. 
The Norms were defined by one of their drafters as a ‘non-voluntary set of 
norms binding upon corporations’.16 Deva expressed the importance of the 
Norms in the observation that they constituted a shift in paradigms ‘that have 
to date dominated the discourse of corporate social responsibility’ and have 
caused ineffective regulation of corporate conduct, resulting in abuses of 
human rights.17 The Norms were defined by their authors largely as a 
restatement of existing obligations of TNCs in respect to human rights under 
international law. However, some of the obligations in the Norms were a 
                                                 
14 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, above n 9.  
15 The Commission decided that the Norms contained ‘useful elements and ideas’ but added 
that it had not requested them and that, as a draft proposal, they had no legal standing. The 
determination of several major industrialised countries to deal with the relationship between 
business and human rights ultimately resulted in the appointment of Ruggie to the post of 
special representative to the UN Secretary General, although with a significantly narrower 
mandate: Backer, above n 9, 288, 331–3; Ruggie, above n 6, 821; Kinley and Chambers, 
above n 9, 449; Martin-Ortega, above n 9, 281.  
16 Sub-Commision on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, above n 9; Hillemanns, 
above n 9, 1071; Weissbrodt and Kruger, above n 9, 901–15; Backer, above n 9, 287; Ruggie, 
above n 6, 820; Kinley and Chambers, above n 9, 467–8; Martin-Ortega, above n 9, 280–1; 
Rule, above n 9, 328.  
17 Deva, above n 13, 497; Hillemanns, above n 9, 1068. On the movement of corporate social 
responsibility and its development see Ronen Shamir, ‘Capitalism, Governance, and 
Authority: The Case of Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2010) 6 Annual Review of Law and 
Social Science 531, 531–53; David Vogel, ‘Private Global Business Regulation’ (2008) 11(1) 
Annual Review of Political Science 261, 261–82. 
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teleological manifestation of an ongoing ‘progressive development’ of the 
existing principles of international law.18 
Perhaps their main novelty, and possibly the main reason for the subsequent 
controversy over the Norms, was the fact that the obligations were to be 
imposed directly on TNCs, rather than states being requested or required to 
implement legislation to regulate the actions of the TNCs within their 
jurisdiction. While most of the rules in the Norms represented obligations 
already recognised within the existing frameworks of international law, in the 
vast majority of cases they are imposed only indirectly on TNCs, through the 
intermediary of the states.19 Baxi further argues that the Norms reflected 
duties that applied to states and that may not be automatically transposed to 
apply to TNCs. In that respect he believes that while the Norms may have 
embodied a good vision of de lege ferenda, or the law to which we may 
aspire, they did not reflect lex lata, or positive existing law.20 
This article identifies three reasons which most likely led to the eventual 
abandoning of the draft Norms by the UN Commission on Human Rights: 
Firstly, the fact that a large part of the Norms constituted a further 
development of existing international norms, rather than actual codification of 
existing international law, enabled critics of the Norms to argue their 
incompatibility, as legal analogies, with otherwise positivist foundations of 
international law. Secondly, the fact that the Norms assigned an important 
legal role to TNCs (and MNCs — Multinational Corporations) rather than to 
the traditional addressees of international law, the states, was problematic.  
The construction of the TNCs as addressees blurred the distinction between 
international public and private legal frameworks, and thus undermined the 
central role of states as international law subjects. Finally, inherent 
contradictions within the Norms themselves and a vagueness in their overall 
nature and applicability helped to foster opposition against their adoption. 
                                                 
18 Weissbrodt and Kruger, above n 9, 913–15; Carlos M Vázquez, ‘Direct vs Indirect 
Obligations of Corporations under International Law’ (2005) 43 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 927, 928; Rule, above n 9, 326; Hillemanns, above n 9, 1070. 
19 Examples of such documents and treaties are the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, and the OECD and UN anti-bribery conventions. See John 
Gerard Ruggie, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN 
Doc E/CN.4/2006/97 (22 February 2006) [61]; Ruggie, above n 6, 822; Kinley and Chambers, 
above n 9, 460; Vázquez, above n 18, 929–30. 
20 Upendra Baxi, ‘Market Fundamentalisms: Business Ethics at the Altar of Human Rights’ 
(2005) 5(1) Human Rights Law Review 1, 14. 
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This article will first examine the reasons that led to the formal recognition of 
the necessity to create the Norms. Secondly it will comment on the drafting of 
the Norms with a focus on the stakeholder environment at the time of this 
process. The third Part will review the main features and novelties introduced 
in the draft document.21 Finally, the article will analyse the responses to the 
Norms, through examining their legal validity and justification. 
II LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT AND RELEVANCE OF THE 
NORMS 
The Norms aimed at ‘maximizing the good that companies do while 
eliminating the abuses they commit’.22 Their rationale was to establish (and 
enforce) a balance between corporate business behaviour and human rights. 
Such a balance would acknowledge the positive role corporations can play in 
regard to economic development and overall prosperity,23 while preventing 
the occurrence of corporate human rights violations. One of its drafters, 
Professor Weissbrodt, argued that grave human rights abuses by corporations 
occur in a variety of business situations and consequently need to be regulated 
at the supranational level.24 
As pointed out by Kinley and Chambers, the 1990s saw widening concerns 
with respect to increased violations of human rights by TNCs. These 
violations were occurring against a background of an increased liberalisation 
of international trade rules, the increase of foreign direct investment in 
developing and emerging economies as well as the growing power and 
influence of MNCs and TNCs.25 The US scholar Blumberg describes the 
impact of such MNC/MNEs (Multinational Enterprises) on global trade and 
business:  
In the modern global economy, the largest corporations conduct worldwide 
operations. They operate in the form of multinational corporate groups 
organized in “incredibly complex” multi-tiered corporate structures 
consisting of a dominant parent corporation, sub holding companies, and 
                                                 
21 This review is not meant to be a comprehensive analysis of the various norms listed in the 
document. For a comprehensive analysis of the various norms in the document, see 
Hillemanns, above n 9; Backer, above n 9; Deva, above n 13; Baxi, above n 20; Campagna, 
above n 13; Weissbrodt and Kruger, above n 9; Weissbrodt, above n 13. 
22 Weissbrodt, above n 13, 58. 
23 William H Meyer, ‘Human Rights and MNCs: Theory versus Quantitative Analysis’ (1996) 
18 Human Rights Quarterly 368, 368–97. 
24 Weissbrodt, above n 13, 56–8. 
25 Kinley and Chambers, above n 9, 457. 
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scores or hundreds of subservient subsidiaries scattered around the world. 
The 1999 World Investment Report estimated that there are almost 60,000 
multinational corporate groups with more than 500,000 foreign subsidiaries 
and affiliates.26   
The UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
(hereinafter Sub-Commission) recognised the possibility of MNCs aiding and 
abetting human rights violations and hence being indirectly liable for them. It 
voiced ‘significant concerns about the conduct of transnational corporations 
and other businesses’.27  
Weissbrodt believed that international law in general, and international human 
rights law (IHRL) in particular, focused on protecting the individual from 
violations by governments, rather than from violations by other actors. 
Weissbrodt also thought that, while new groups of non-state actors are 
becoming subject to liability through the operation of various sub-fields of 
international law, TNCs and businesses in general remained largely 
unaffected by these developments.28 While some international legal 
documents may be interpreted as applying to corporations, most of them have 
applied to the TNCs only indirectly.29 However, such indirect regulation did 
                                                 
26 Phillip I Blumberg, ‘Asserting Human Rights against Multinational Corporations under 
United States Law: Conceptual and Procedural Problems’ (2002) 50 The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 493, 493; Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, ‘Human Rights and Global 
Business: The Evolving Notion of Corporate Civil Responsibility’ [2009] Indian Yearbook of 
International Law and Policy 193, 193–220. 
27 Weissbrodt, above n 13, 64. 
28 Such sub-fields of international law include the operation of the international criminal 
tribunals and the ICC (in which individuals can be held responsible for their actions), 
international humanitarian law (IHL) (under which armed opposition groups can be held 
responsible), and international criminal law (ICL) (under which terrorists and traffickers in 
human beings may be held responsible). See ibid 59–60; Permanent Mission of Canada to the 
Office of the United Nations in Geneva, ‘Submission of Canada to the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights on the Responsibilities of Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights’ (OHCHR 2004) [2.2], [3.3]–[3.4]; but see S R Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human 
Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’ (2001) 111 Yale Law Journal 443, 377–88. 
29 Among such documents one can recall the OECD Guidelines, ILO’s Tripartite Declaration, 
the Convention on Combating Bribery, as well as the Warsaw Convention. Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development, above n 12; International Labour Organization, 
above n 12; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, opened for signature 21 December 1965, GA 2106 (XX), UNTS vol. 660, 
195 (entered into force 4 January 1969); Convention For the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to International Carriage by Air, opened for signature 12 October 1929, 137 LNTS 
11 (entered into force 13 February 1933). See generally Vázquez, above n 18; but see David 
Kinley and Junko Tadaki, ‘From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law’ (2004) 44(4) Virginia Journal of 
International Law 931, 946–7. 
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not prevent abuses of human rights by businesses and therefore several 
international efforts to create frameworks of direct obligations on TNCs were 
made. These attempts included the unsuccessful attempts to establish a UN 
Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and the Global Compact initiative.30  
The new Norms seemed at last to remedy the lack of accountability of 
corporations. Scholars were referring to the Norms, after their final drafting 
and their eventual disappearance from the agenda of the UN, as the ‘most 
promising human rights norms for TNCs to date’.31 The German government 
described the Norms as a ‘useful contribution to the ongoing debate on ways 
and means of integrating business enterprises in the international endeavours 
to promote and protect human rights and sustainable development’.32 The 
drafting initiative was supported by many NGOs.33 Furthermore, several 
transnational businesses, which participated in the ‘Initiative for Respect’ and 
the ‘Ethical Globalisation Initiative’, volunteered to participate in the ‘pilot 
project’ for the Norms, as part of their wider commitment to human rights.34 
                                                 
30 UNCTC, above n 12, 231–43; International Labour Organization, above n 12; Organization 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development, above n 12; Weissbrodt and Kruger, above n 
9, 903; Peter T Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford University Press, 
2nd ed, 2007) 474–6; Kinley and Chambers, above n 9, 455–6; Ratner, above n 28, 454–9; 
Ruggie, above n 6, 819; Campagna, above n 13, 1206–7; John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Global-
governance.net: The Global Compact as Learning Network’ (2001) 7 Global Governance, 
371, 371–8; John Gerard Ruggie, ‘The Theory and Practice of Learning Networks: Corporate 
Social Responsibility and the Global Compact’ (2002) 5 Journal of Corporate Citizenship 27, 
27–36 (‘United Nations Global Compact’). 
31 See Deva, above n 13, 497; Campagna, above n 13; Hillemanns, above n 9, 1065; Weissbrodt 
and Kruger, above n 9; Weissbrodt, above n 13, 55. 
32 Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Office of the United Nations 
and to the Other International Organizations in Geneva, ‘German response to OHCHR notes 
verbale of 19 May 2004 and 22 July 2004 regarding CHR Decision 2004/116 – 
Responsibilities of transactional corporations and related business enterprises with regard to 
human rights’, Communication to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (29 
September 2004) <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalization/business/docs/ 
germany.pdf>. 
33 The list of NGOs supporting the initiative included Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, Oxfam, and the Prince of Wales International Business Leaders Forum. See 
Weissbrodt and Kruger, above n 9, 906. 
34 These businesses were: ABB, Barclays Bank, National Grid Transco, Novartis, Novo 
Nordisk, MTV and The Body Shop International, Gap Inc, Hewlett-Packard, Statoil; ibid 907; 
Kinley and Chambers, above n 9, 461; Weissbrodt, above n 13, 72–3. 
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The Norms drew heavily from existing human rights documents35 and it 
seems that their overall aim was to fill a void in the existing frameworks of 
international law, by providing a single, comprehensive and constituting set of 
human rights norms with binding effect for all corporations. They were 
designed to serve as an accessible legal document which could be applied 
even by non-experts in international human rights law, particularly corporate 
directors. Deva further explained that the need to draft the Norms as a separate 
document, relying on other conventions and applying them to TNCs, was in 
fact evidence of the presence of certain gaps in the existing legal framework.36 
On the other hand, one must question whether this need truly existed or 
whether the Norms were yet another redundant document. Campagna 
observed that the duty of TNCs to ‘respect, protect and ensure human rights’ 
worldwide, under the framework of the Norms, constituted a formal 
recognition of legal principles of international human rights law as evolved 
since World War II and particularly since the end of the Cold War.37  
III DRAFTING HISTORY 
The Norms were not the first attempt to regulate the connection between 
business and human rights.38 They were preceded by a number of initiatives 
within the legal framework of the OECD and UN.39 However, these ‘soft law’ 
‘CSR’ (Corporate Social Responsibility) styled initiatives did not seem to be 
sufficient to eliminate corporate abuses of human rights. In 1998 a Working 
Group on the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational Corporations 
was established by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities.40 It was mandated inter alia  
                                                 
35 Many existing human rights documents are mentioned in the Preamble to the Norms, inter 
alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Slavery Convention and the 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See the full list at Sub-Commission on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, above n 9, 3–7. See also Kinley and 
Chambers, above n 9, 451; Rule, above n 9, 333. 
36 Deva, above n 13, 499. 
37 Campagna, above n 13, 1222. 
38 Kinley and Chambers, aboven 9, 455. 
39 See above n 19 and the accompanying text. 
40 Ragnwaldh and Konopik, above n 7, 251–2. 
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to make recommendations and proposals relating to the methods of work 
and activities of transnational corporations in order to ensure that such 
methods and activities are in keeping with the economic and social 
objectives of the countries in which they operate, and to promote the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights and the right to 
development, as well as of civil and political rights.41  
The Working Group drew from prior work which was based on three 
background reports.42 The first report of 1995 emphasised the gradual shift of 
power from states to TNCs, noting the adverse effect of the global strategies 
of TNCs on the promotion of human rights, and particularly international 
labour and trade union rights.43 A second report of 1996 focused on the 
                                                 
41 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, ‘The 
Relationship Between the Enjoyment of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Right 
to Development, and the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational Corporations’, 
above n 8, 4(d). During the subsequent years, the mandate of the Working Group was 
expanded several times. When the mandate was further extended in 2001, the Sub-
Commission’s Resolution 2001/3 provided more detail on the expected outcome of the 
Working Group in paragraph 4. ‘(b) Compile a list of the various relevant instruments and 
norms concerning human rights and international cooperation that are applicable to 
transnational corporations; (c) Contribute to the drafting of relevant norms concerning human 
rights and transnational corporations and other economic units whose activities have an 
impact on human rights; (d) Analyse the possibility of establishing a monitoring mechanism 
in order to apply sanctions and obtain compensation for infringements committed and damage 
caused by transnational corporations, and contribute to the drafting of binding norms for that 
purpose;’ Sub-Commission on Human Rights, above n 8; Weissbrodt and Kruger, above n 9, 
904–5; Kinley and Chambers, above n 9, 463. 
42 Backer, above n 9, 322; Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
above n 8; Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
The Relationship between the Enjoyment of Human Rights, in Particular, International 
Labour and Trade Union Rights, and the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational 
Corporations, 47th sess, Agenda Item 8, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/11 (24 July 1995); Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Impact of the 
Activities and Working Methods of Transnational Corporations on the Full Enjoyment of All 
Human Rights, in Particular Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Right to 
Development, Bearing in Mind Existing International Guidelines, Rules and Standards 
Relating to the Subject-Matter, 48th sess, Agenda Item 8, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/12 (2 
July 19996); Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
Working Document on the Impact of the Activities of Transnational Corporations on the 
Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Prepared by Mr. El Hadji Guissé, 
Pursuant to Sub-Commission Resolution 1997/11, UN ESCOR 50th sess, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/6 (10 June 1998). 
43 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, ‘The 
Relationship Between the Enjoyment of Human Rights, in Particular, International Labour 
and Trade Union Rights, and the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational 
Corporations’ above n 42; Backer further argues that the report goes further and essentially 
defines the state as ‘any amalgamation of power that can assert the power normally exercised 
by, or otherwise coerce entities that are recognized as states'. In accordance with this analysis, 
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possibilities of subjecting a corporation as a whole to a single jurisdiction.44 
Of particular importance was the third report by El-Hadji Guissé in 1998. 
According to Backer, El-Hadji Guissé’s work with and through the Working 
Group provided the legal foundations and perspectives for what eventually 
became the Norms.  
The report presented as a thesis that TNCs were ‘vehicles’ in the transfer of 
wealth away from the poor to the rich, which in fact represented a market 
failure in need of fundamental correction. The report claimed that while the 
raison d’être of the TNCs was to make profit, they also had to comply with 
the system of values on which our existence is based. Therefore the report 
emphasised the importance of regulating and restraining the actions of TNCs 
through national regulation and international cooperation of states.45 It is 
submitted, however, that, unlike the Norms that followed and deviated from 
the other two background reports, Guissé’s report concerned solely the 
responsibilities and duties of states to regulate the conduct of TNCs, rather 
than establishing direct responsibilities for TNCs themselves.46 
The process of discussion and drafting was lengthy, with the mandate of the 
Working Group being renewed and altered several times.47 The Working 
Group began preparing the Norms in August 1999. It held annual public 
hearings, attended by selected representatives from business, the unions, 
NGOs, the scholarly community and other interested persons and met in 
Geneva between 2000 and 2003. The various drafts were also published on 
the internet and in the UN publications.48 
The final detailed document and its commentary were introduced and 
approved in August 2003 by the Sub-Commission. The Sub-Commission sent 
                                                                                                                    
the TNCs are to be treated as being on a level similar to states and should therefore have some 
of the responsibilities according to their role: Backer, above n 9, 322–3.  
44 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, ‘The Impact 
of the Activities and Working Methods of Transnational Corporations on the Full Enjoyment 
of All Human Rights, in Particular Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Right to 
Development, Bearing in Mind Existing International Guidelines, Rules and Standards 
Relating to the Subject-Matter’ above n 42, 22; Backer, above n 9, 325–6. 
45 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, above n 42, 
[13], [24]–[5]; Backer, above n 9, 326–7. 
46 On the direct linkage between international law and TNCs in the Norms. See Backer, above n 
9, 374–5. 
47 Weissbrodt and Kruger, above n 9, 903–5; Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, above n 8; Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, above n 8. 
48 Weissbrodt, above n 13, 67–8; Hillemanns, above n 9, 1069–70. 
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the Norms to its parent body, the former UN Commission on Human Rights. 
On 22 April 2004, by an ‘action without a vote’, a consensual decision, the 
UN Commission on Human Rights significantly narrowed the original 
objectives and methodologies of the Norms. It recommended that ECOSOC 
should confirm the importance of the question of the responsibilities of 
transnational corporations with regard to human rights. It also requested that 
the new Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
compile a report setting out the scope and legal status of current initiatives 
and standards relating to the responsibility of transnational corporations. The 
report affirmed that the Norms had no legal standing, had not been requested 
by the Commission and that the Sub-Commission would not perform any 
monitoring function in relation to the Norms.49 The Commission disseminated 
the document for further comment, as was recommended by the Sub-
Commission, and received over 90 comments in six months. The 2004 session 
of the Commission welcomed the Norms, yet, in light of the widespread 
criticism from various states and the business community,50 noted that it had 
not actually asked for such a document and that, as a draft before the 
Commission, the document did not have any legal status on its own.51  
IV PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT, NOVELTIES AND 
SHORTFALLS OF THE NORMS 
The Norms were, in many ways, setting new legal standards regarding 
corporate human rights responsibilities. Although reflecting and drawing from 
already existing human rights obligations, the Norms incorporated notions of 
progressive development and novel conceptions of human rights protection. 
The Norms attempted to establish direct responsibility of TNCs for human 
rights violations, utilising existing frameworks of international law. They 
aimed to establish an explicit duty for TNCs to promote human rights from 
‘top to bottom’, even in respect of corporations registered in non-state parties. 
These norms were designed to constitute a ‘non-voluntary’ framework, which 
was far more codified than any voluntary framework, but which fell short of 
                                                 
49 Backer, above n 9, 331. 
50 See the discussion on the criticism of the Norms in Part 5 below. 
51 Kinley and Chambers, above n 9, 451, 463; Weissbrodt, above n 13, 64–8; Baxi, above n 20, 
2; One should note, however, that although the Commission was correct that it did not ask for 
this document, the Sub-Commission had full powers to ask for its drafting as it did. See the 
Resolutions of the Sub-Commission defining the Mandate of the Working Group: Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, above n 8; Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, above n 8. 
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being mandatory, constituting ‘soft law’ instead of ‘hard law’. This Part will 
discuss these novelties and contradictions. 
The Preamble of the Norms essentially reiterated the fundamental character of 
Corporate Social Responsibility as a means to promote and protect human 
rights.52 The Norms were basically a furtherance of human rights principles 
already set down in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) of 
1948.53 Campagna thought that the legal foundations of the duty of TNCs to 
promote and protect human rights, as defined in the Norms, derived directly 
from the UDHR.54 As part of the attempt to characterise the Norms as a mere 
codification of already established principles of customary international law, 
rather than a progressive development of such legal principles, the Preamble 
contained an open, non-exhaustive list of the international treaties and 
conventions which established the legal basis for TNCs’ obligations in the 
area of human rights. Some of them arguably even reached the level of jus 
cogens.55 In Baxi’s view, this raised the problem of intelligibility, as not 
everyone among those affected by corporate violations of human rights— nor 
among the CEOs in the business community — is familiar with the full range 
of human rights instruments referred to in the Norms.56 Consequently, the 
                                                 
52 Backer, above n 9, 341. 
53 Hillemanns, above n 9, 1072; Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, above n 9, Preamble. 
54 Campagna, above n 13, 1208; See also Louis Henkin, ‘The Universal Declaration at 50 and 
the Challenge of Global Markets’ (1999) 25 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 17, 24–5 
presenting the thesis upon which to build the obligations of the corporations to the UDHR. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen 
mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) Preamble; see also the response of Germany to the 
Norms, claiming that the UDHR does apply direct obligations on TNCs: Permanent Mission 
of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Office of the United Nations and to the Other 
International Organizations in Geneva, above n 32. It is, however, questionable whether the 
UDHR is part of customary international law. See Hurst Hannum, ‘The Status of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law’ (1996) 25 
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 287, 322–35; Campagna, above n 13, 
1209; and whether the application of UDHR norms to non-state actors is not an overstretching 
thereof. See Deva, above n 13, 498; but see Filartiga v Pena-Irala 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 
1980); Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, ‘Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human 
Rights Abuses’ (2001) 24 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 339, 340–1. 
55 Baxi, above n 20, 3 claims that these references to prior textual enunciations are very 
characteristic of soft law documents and represent a process of ‘self-generating normative 
cannibalism, or self-devouring conspicuous consumption’. This reliance on what the drafters 
of the Norms believed to be established principles of international law, allowed them to 
ground their presentation of the Norms as a restatement of existing international law: Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, above n 9, Preamble; Deva, 
above n 13, 498. 
56 As one may recall, the text of the Norms refers to at least 56 previous human rights 
instruments: Baxi, above n 20, 3–6; but see Rule, above n 9, 330 who claims that one of the 
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Preamble of the Norms not only served as an introduction to the main 
document, but also explained the core substance of the Norms.57  
The operative part of the Norms was divided into seven main categories. It 
presented a comprehensive list of human rights obligations relevant to TNCs. 
The Norms did not set down so called ‘negative’ duties58 (whereby TNCs 
should refrain from violating human rights), but rather introduced as a 
‘positive’ duty for TNCs the obligation to promote and ensure respect for 
human rights.59 It thus supplemented the traditional, horizontal scale of state 
‘sponsored’ human rights protection.  
Under ‘General Obligations’ in Part A of the Norms were listed the following 
responsibilities: the duty of due diligence to ensure that business activities do 
not directly or indirectly contribute to human rights abuses; the duty to ensure 
that corporations do not benefit from such abuses; the duty to refrain from 
undermining efforts to promote human rights; the duty of a corporation to use 
its influence to promote human rights; the obligation to assess the human 
rights impact of the corporation; and the overall responsibility to avoid 
complicity in human rights abuses.60  
These obligations are significant and affected the entire document.61 Article 1 
recognised states as the traditional holders of the primary responsibilities  
                                                                                                                    
advantages of the Norms, is the fact that they present in a single document, the entire array of 
human rights applicable to TNCs. 
57 Backer, above n 9, 342–3 substantiates his claim that the Preamble is part of the substantive 
obligations of the Norms based on the fact that the Norms are to be elaborated and interpreted 
according to the Preamble. However, this characterises the role of every Preamble according 
to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and therefore contradicts Backer’s claim, as 
the role of the Preamble is specifically designed to differ from the role of the substantive part. 
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
(entered into force 27 January 1980) art 31. 
58 Negative duties are the duties to refrain from doing something, ie ‘not to obstruct the right to 
demonstrations’; while positive duties are duties to do something actively, ie ‘to provide free 
education’. See, eg, Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ 
Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 
(1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156, 184. 
59 Deva, above n 13, 497–9. 
60 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, above n 9, General 
Obligations. 
61 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Commentary on the 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with Regard to Human Rights, UN ESCOR 55th sess 22nd mtg Agenda Item 4, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (26 August 2003) art 1(a); Deva, above n 13, 502. 
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to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect 
human rights recognized in international as well as national law, including 
ensuring that transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
respect human rights.62  
The Norms’ overall impact, however, would have been more radical than 
Article 1 suggests: they essentially relegated states to the background in the 
attempt to protect human rights in the transnational business context. TNCs 
would have been forced to operate against the interests of a state in order to 
comply with the ‘greater, internationally-derived good’ of transnational 
human rights compliance.63  
The primacy of the role given to corporations, and its lack of definition in the 
Norms led to significant reservations being expressed against such — 
perceived — ‘demotion’ of states. Baxi argued that there are several possible 
interpretations of the term ‘primary responsibility’ which would significantly 
influence the scope of the role of the states and their obligations according to 
the Norms.64 The United States Council for International Business criticised 
the Norms for the fact that they ‘represent a fundamental shift in responsibility 
for protecting human rights — from governments to private actors, including 
companies — effectively privatizing the enforcement of human rights laws’.65 
This critique was aimed at the very nature of the Norms. They were intended 
to improve human rights protection in cases where states failed to act, thereby 
widening the scope of applicability of international human rights law by 
including situations where corporations have de facto greater influence than 
that of the states66 
                                                 
62 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, above n 9, art 1; 
Weissbrodt, above n 13, 64–5. 
63 Backer, above n 9, 373. 
64 Even if one claims that the explanation for the lack of commentary on this term relates to the 
fact that the Norms are focusing on TNCs, one can still understand the role of the states as 
either active or passive. Baxi, above n 20, 9–10. 
65 Vázquez, above n 18, 929; Timothy E Deal, ‘The Human Rights Responsibilities of 
International Business’ (Paper presented at the Frank Hawkins Kenan Institute of Private 
Enterprise Seminar, ‘Are Human Rights the Business of Business?’, United States Council for 
International Business, Washington DC, 10 December 2003). 
66 Kinley and Chambers, above n 9, 465–72; Facsimile Message from Australian Permanent 
Mission to the UN to OHCHR, 8 September 2004, ‘Comments by Australia in Respect of the 
Report Requested from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights by the 
Commission on Human Rights in its Decision 2004/116 of 20 April 2004 on Existing 
Initiatives and Standards Relating to the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and 
Related Business Enterprises With Regard to Human Rights’ <http://www2.ohchr.org/ 
english/issues/globalization/business/docs/australia.pdf>. 
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Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, 
secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights 
recognized in international as well as national law, including the rights and 
interests of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups.67  
The ‘Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ 
clarified that the Norms should apply regardless of the state in which TNCs 
operated, and what the level of human rights protection in the respective state 
was.68 
The Norms laid down, as specific rules and obligations for corporations, the 
duty to protect the right to equal opportunity and non-discriminatory 
treatment, the right to security of persons, labour rights of workers, the right 
of fair remuneration, the respect for national sovereignty and human rights, 
obligations relating to consumer protection (which were uniquely designed for 
TNCs) and, finally, obligations with regard to environmental protection.69  
Of particular interest is Part E of the Norms, in which TNCs were identified as 
possible multipliers for the development of a global business society bound to 
the rule of law, transparency, accountability and sustainable development, and 
in which the peoples’ civil, political, economic and cultural rights were 
realised. This was an innovation in three main respects. Firstly, instead of 
limiting TNCs’ obligations to civil and political rights only, the Norms 
included both civil rights and collective social, economic and cultural rights of 
the second and third generations of human rights. Secondly, as mentioned 
above, this imposed positive obligations upon TNCs, which in effect created a 
‘quasi’ horizontal structure of human rights protection. Thirdly, TNCs were 
expected to respect and promote even the rights of those individuals who were 
affected only indirectly by their activities.70 
Part H dealt with the general provisions concerning implementation of the 
Norms.71 Deva distinguished between direct and indirect aspects of 
                                                 
67 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, above n 9, Part A art 1; 
Campagna, above n 13, 1225. 
68 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, above n 61, art 1(a); 
Deva, above n 13, 502. 
69 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, above n 9, B–G. These 
rules are explained and explicated in great detail in the Commentary attached to the Norms. 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protecton of Human Rights, above n 61. 
70 Deva, above n 13, 507; Vázquez, above n 18, 945; see also Ratner, above n 28, 499–500. 
71 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, above n 9, H. 
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implementation of the Norms as defined there. TNCs were expected to both 
internalise the culture of the Norms, as well as being subjected to periodic 
monitoring and verification by different bodies. Indirectly, the Norms were to 
be promoted through amendment by the states of their national legal 
frameworks, which would ensure that TNCs implemented the Norms.72 
Backer claimed that, through the general provisions, the Norms exploited the 
flexibility of private lawmaking to maximise the efficiency of 
implementation, without the interference of state actors.73  
The final part of the Norms, Part I provided various definitions required for 
the interpretation of the Norms.74 Of particular importance was the definition 
of the term ‘transnational corporation’, which was kept deliberately broad and 
referred to an ‘economic entity operating in more than one country or a cluster 
of economic entities operating in two or more countries — whatever their 
legal form, whether in their home country or country of activity, and whether 
taken individually or collectively’. This definition was to be read in 
conjunction with the definition of ‘other business entities’, which was drawn 
up to ‘ensure that transnational corporations could not change their identity ... 
and therefore avoid the draft Norms’, and potentially included nearly all 
existent business entities to date.75 The terms ‘human rights’ and 
‘international human rights’ were also defined widely for the purposes of the 
Norms. The terms included  
civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, as set forth in the 
International Bill of Human Rights and other human rights treaties, as well 
as the right to development and rights recognized by international 
humanitarian law, international refugee law, international labour law, and 
other relevant instruments adopted within the United Nations system.76  
This definition allowed the inclusion of human rights norms and standards of 
different levels and generations. While some of the norms listed in the 
document had universal legal effect, others were norms of positive character 
existent only between parties to certain agreements. Some were even norms 
with no general legal effect and as such of nonbinding ‘soft law’ effect.77 
                                                 
72 Deva, above n 13, 514–18. 
73 Backer, above n 9, 334. 
74 Sub-Commision on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, above n 9, I. 
75 Ibid 20–1; Backer, above n 9, 337. 
76 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, above n 9, 23. 
77 Backer, above n 9, 340. 
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It seems that a discrepancy existed between the major issues discussed while 
drafting the Norms and the issues which were the basis for the later criticism 
of the Norms. There were five main features of the norms which were widely 
discussed during the drafting process.  
The first was the scope of application of the Norms and the decision to define 
the term ‘transnational corporations’ to include all types of business entities. 
Weissbrodt emphasised that, while most media attention focused on the 
misdeeds of major corporations, applying human rights standards only to 
large TNCs could have been considered discriminatory. Moreover, the 
drafters considered it difficult to define the term TNC in such a way as not to 
allow corporate lawyers to restructure the corporation in a way that would 
prevent these standards being applied to this corporation.78  
Secondly, because the drafters of the Norms believed that the principles 
should be respected by all businesses, and in order to avoid distinctions 
between the standards applied to domestic and transnational corporations, 
they applied the Norms to all corporations, while minimizing the need for 
implementation of the rules by small ‘mom and pop’ shops.79  
Thirdly, the drafters of the Norms decided on an approach according to which 
the power and the influence of a corporation should be matched by the 
appropriate level of responsibility.80  
Fourthly, the Norms were designed to constitute the most comprehensive and 
human rights-focused document applying transnational rules to businesses up 
to that time.81  
Finally, the Norms were designed to have a special non-voluntary character. 
While the Norms did not amount to an ‘international treaty’, according to their 
drafters, the drafters described the Norms as a ‘soft-law’ restatement of the 
principles applicable to corporations. Such principles were derived from 
international treaties and customary international law.82  
                                                 
78 Weissbrodt, above n 13, 65–6; see also Baxi, above n 20, 6–9. 
79 Deva, above n 13, 500–1; Weissbrodt and Kruger, above n 9, 907–12. 
80 This approach is in line with the theory of legal responsibility of corporations suggested by 
Ratner: Ratner, above n 28. 
81 Furthermore, one of the much disputed additions to the Norms was their encouragement of 
further evolution of the existing and similar human rights standards: Weissbrodt, above n 13, 
66–7. 
82 Weissbrodt and Kruger, above n 9, 907–15; Deva, above n 13, 513; Weissbrodt, above n 13, 
67. 
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Another novelty of the Norms was their use of a binding ‘shall’ language, 
instead of the previously accepted ‘should’ terminology.83 
Out of the issues mentioned above, only the all-inclusive and the non-
voluntary character of the Norms were mentioned by the opponents of the 
Norms. The criticism of the Norms was focused mostly on 1) the transition of 
responsibility from states to TNCs and the associated alteration of the 
traditional framework of international law; 2) the imposition on TNCs of 
responsibility for the actions of other actors; and 3) the perceived excessive 
legalism of the document on the one hand and its vagueness on the other.  
The Norms related to TNCs as entities with distinct social, cultural, civil and 
political rights and duties. The Norms did not treat TNCs only as legal entities 
whose function is limited to the economic sphere and whose activities must be 
regulated in order for the entity to remain active in this sphere. Backer 
asserted that the Norms treated corporations as ‘virtual State actors’ for the 
purposes of many normative requirements.84 They bypassed the medium of 
the state, in order to create a direct link between international law and TNCs. 
In doing so they made the TNCs important actors in promoting human rights, 
mainly in the developing countries, but also in the developed countries that 
refused to adopt certain human rights norms.85 
Several aspects of the Norms are worthy of a deeper analysis. The Norms 
drew from previous human rights instruments the obligations relevant to 
TNCs and other business entities and applied them directly to the 
corporations. At the same time they reemphasised the primary and the 
overarching responsibility of the states.86 Kinley and Chambers identified four 
points where the Norms diverged from traditional human rights documents.  
                                                 
83 Deva, above n 13, 499–500; Deal, above n 65; Professor Emeritus Maurice Mendelson QC, 
‘In the Matter of the Draft ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ (Opinion Piece, OHCHR, 4 April 
2004) [5]. This fact is inconsistent with the general normative language of the document. Rule 
links this with the previous failures to promote human rights laws enforced by the UN, and a 
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accordingly the pace of corresponding changes in the law: Rule, above n 9, 332. 
84 Backer, above n 9, 371. Moreover, through this the Norms seem to contradict the obligation 
to respect national sovereignty as defined in article 10 of the Norms. 
85 One example is that of the United States, which continuously refused to ratify the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Nevertheless, through the 
Norms, the TNCs therein would become bound by that instrument: ibid 353, 371–2. 
86 Rule, above n 9, 333. 
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Firstly, unlike other human rights instruments, the Norms revolved around the 
duty-bearers, to which the different rules apply, rather than focusing on a 
single set of rights (civil, political, and economic) or rights holders (women, 
children, racial groups).87 The focus of the Norms on duty-bearers, rather than 
on a specific set of rights also caused them to be indeterminate about the exact 
scope of the specific rights, applicable to the TNCs.88  
Secondly, the notion of a ‘sphere of influence’, and thus responsibility, 
derived from the corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement. This aspect 
of the Norms has also been criticised for not being clear enough, and being 
ambiguous about the question of whether the entire supply chain of the 
corporation lies within its ‘sphere of activity and influence’.89  
Thirdly, the Norms sought to establish new enforcement mechanisms 
applicable to non-state actors, and to make non-state actors the promoters of 
these norms and mechanisms when entering into contractual relationships 
with their business partners.90 The subject of enforcement was a key issue 
addressed by the Norms.91 TNCs were to be subject to ‘periodic monitoring 
and verification by United Nations and other international and national 
mechanisms already in existence or yet to be created regarding the application 
of the Norms.’92 Vázquez further claimed that states would be reluctant to 
create and maintain institutions, established under the Norms, as this would 
limit their own sovereign powers.93 Furthermore, he suggested that legal 
norms were less likely to be observed by non-state actors in the absence of 
effective enforcement mechanisms carrying sanctions.94 Another alleged 
shortcoming of this mechanism was its unintended anti-democratic character: 
an allegation based on the fact that the Norms had been drafted by subject 
matter experts and were not subject to further scrutiny by the (affected) states. 
                                                 
87 Kinley and Chambers, above n 9, 452. 
88 The Norms are, therefore, ambiguous on whether the same scope of positive obligations 
applies to TNCs as it does to states. See Deva, above n 13, 510–511. 
89 Kinley and Chambers, above n 9, 452; Deva, above n 13, 502–3; Baxi, above n 20, 11–14. 
90 Kinley and Chambers, above n 9, 452–3; Baxi, above n 20, 18. 
91 Weissbrodt, above n 13, 67; Backer, above n 9, 384. 
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above n 66; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Decision 2004/116 - Responsibilities of 
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This outcome could have been the result of the influence of NGOs on the 
drafting process.95 Yet another perceived shortfall of this mechanism was its 
supposed lack of enforcement available in case of violations.96 However, this 
shortcoming was only alleged. In fact, there was a rigid enforcement 
mechanism which obligated the TNCs to have business relations only with 
TNCs that adhered to the Norms. Another element of implementation was the 
duty of the TNCs to provide ‘prompt, effective and adequate reparations to 
those persons, entities and communities’ that had been adversely affected by 
failure to comply with the Norms.97 
Fourthly, the Norms added to the traditional list of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms other rights associated with consumer protection, the 
environment and issues of corruption.98 Kinley and Chambers observed that 
this development was sensible as violations of the dominant norms in these 
areas may lead to violations of other, more basic human rights, such as the 
right to life99 and may deny populations their economic, social and cultural 
rights100 and other basic and widely accepted rights such as the right to health 
and the right to development.101   
One of the advantages of the Norms was the range of their possible impact. 
By virtue of their non-voluntary nature they had, as an instrument of 
regulation, the potential to overcome the so-called ‘free-rider’ dilemma of 
many TNCs. By contrast, the adoption by TNCs of voluntary programmes for 
the protection of human rights would disadvantage them economically against 
their competitors in the market, who did not take similar actions.102 Backer 
also argued that the support for the Norms by both important sectors of civil 
society and by the international law establishment was evidence for the 
evolving of transnational law, an evolution which has produced ‘a mechanics 
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of interplay between national, international, public, and private law systems in 
allocating and competing for regulatory power’.103  
V THE NORMS — AN APPRAISAL 
This Part analyses the responses to the Norms through examining the validity 
of and reasons for these responses.  
Backer identified and analysed the two main types of response to the Norms. 
The ‘public sector oriented’ participants, a term which mainly refers to 
academics and NGOs, supported this instrument for being an advance over 
existing voluntary standards by providing a single comprehensive regime 
which drew an appropriate balance between the obligations of states and those 
of companies with respect to human rights. They claimed that the Norms 
provided also a template for state compliance with human rights along with a 
system of restorative remedies for individuals supervised by a supra-national 
organisation. The second group, ‘private sector’ or ‘market oriented’ 
participants, emphasised the extreme radicalism of the Norms — the 
mandatory approach; the presumption that private economic entities were 
more, rather than less, likely to promote human rights and development; the 
lack of a legal basis for imposing obligations on TNCs under international 
law, particularly in light of the vagueness and questionable legal effect of 
some of the norms mentioned in the document.104 The second group was the 
more influential one, and it was the one that eventually determined the future 
of the Norms.  
We shall first examine the responses of the business sector. Despite the fact 
that the majority in the business community — mainly the business chambers 
and industry organisations — rejected the Norms, some favoured the 
application of the Norms and even volunteered as test participants in an 
implementation of the Norms. On the other hand, parts of the business 
community claimed that compliance with human rights law should be by 
choice and should occur only to the extent needed by the business community. 
They also argued that nation states, rather than the UN, should enforce human 
rights.105 The International Chamber of Commerce and the International 
Organisation of Employers issued a joint statement opposing the Norms and 
their ‘legalistic approach’. At the same time the US Council for International 
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Business opposed the Norms through criticising their vagueness. Senior Vice 
President Deal, claimed that the Norms created a ‘legal no man’s land’.106 He 
argued that because the document did not distinguish between binding and 
non-binding human rights obligations (since some of its principles were 
drawn from non-binding human rights instruments) it blurred the line between 
voluntary and mandatory corporate compliance, thus making ‘corporate 
compliance virtually impossible’.107 Kinley and Chambers argued, however, 
that a certain level of vagueness was not only expected from an international 
document (as opposed to domestic legislation), but was actually required in 
order to create consensus on the international level.108 
Under the Norms, the duties of the TNCs were to increase not just directly, 
but indirectly as well. Not only might the Norms have placed a legal liability 
upon a corporation which colluded with a state in the commission of human 
rights violations, but they also stipulated the duty of a TNC to ‘impose’ 
human rights obligations upon states, even if these states refused to ratify the 
human rights instruments involved.109 Backer claimed that this reflected the 
use of mechanisms of so called ‘low level’ international governance, meaning 
international governance that arises ‘at the level of private law in the 
municipal systems of sovereign states’, which has been a contested issue in 
the field of international relations.110 As Deva observed, the Norms were 
probably too focused on stressing the importance of the universality of human 
rights, while ignoring both operational standards and the realities of human 
rights protection in the context of corporate business realities, and regional 
and cultural differences.111  
Perhaps, the best characterisation of the approach adopted by the Norms was 
reflected in the eleventh paragraph of its Preamble:  
Noting that transnational corporations and other business enterprises have 
the capacity to foster economic well-being, development, technological 
improvement and wealth as well as the capacity to cause harmful impacts 
on the human rights and lives of individuals through their core business 
practices and operations, including employment practices, environmental 
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policies, relationships with suppliers and consumers, interactions with 
Governments and other activities ...112  
According to some commentators, the second part of this paragraph and the 
extended scope of responsibility of TNCs for the activities of other 
participants in the business chain, such as suppliers, partners, joint ventures 
and even governments, was one of the most problematic aspects of the 
Norms.113 The business community criticised the Norms and referred to the 
benefits of corporate business activities in terms of economic growth and 
stability as well as its own commitment to voluntary self regulation in the few 
cases where human rights violations were happening. John Cridland, Deputy 
Director-General of the Confederation of British Industries (CBI) was quoted 
to have said, ‘[t]hat leaves business having to blow the whistle on something 
that aims to subject firms to criticism and liability for abusing human rights. It 
is quite wrong to suggest that firms are generally involved in widespread 
abuse of human rights — where is the evidence?’114  
Another major concern for many corporations was the matter of reparations 
that the companies would be liable to pay, in accordance with the Norms.115 
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This was particularly worrisome, because, as mentioned above, TNCs might 
have been liable not only for the direct actions of the corporation itself, but for 
the ill-deeds of their suppliers, joint venturers and other groups, including 
governments, from whose activities they as corporations might have 
benefited.116  
Campagna argued that the main reason for the general opposition of the 
business community to the Norms was not some perceived flaws in the text of 
the Norms. Rather, it was a substantial flaw in the thinking of business leaders 
when faced with the prospect of applying international human rights standards 
to business strategies. She alleged that businesses viewed the need for 
adherence to IHRL solely as a management issue, whereas, in her opinion, 
only the question of whether to comply with IHRL constituted a management 
issue. The more essential question of general human rights compliance 
resembled a legal issue which should not be left to the discretion of businesses 
alone to decide.117 The Norms therefore represented a major deviation from 
the self-regulation approach which was more widely accepted and preferred 
when relations between business and human rights needed to be governed.118  
Backer regarded the Norms as going even further — altering the foundations 
of corporate regulation by actually transforming the authority to regulate 
TNCs. The drastic change in the definition of stakeholders that was embedded 
in the Norms altered the foundations of corporate governance and regulation. 
Backer’s view was that human rights under the Norms would enter municipal 
legal systems and international law not from above as part of prescribed 
international treaty law, but rather from below through private law governing 
business relations, which would then establish binding rules which in turn 
would become new customary international law.119 
The far-reaching character of the Norms drew significant opposition from 
various states as well. Most states expressed strong reservations, emphasising 
the undesired departure from the traditional framework of international law, 
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and stressing the central role of the state as an actor under international law.120 
Backer further pointed out that many states indicated that they would be 
unwilling to accept any legal regime which had the potential to threaten their 
monopoly of power to adopt and implement international norms within their 
territory.  
Developing states were concerned that the Norms favoured the 
implementation of human rights standards in their state territory by means of 
corporate authority rather than state control.121 Another concern was that the 
Norms could reduce incentives for some TNCs to expand their operations into 
developing states, due to considerations based on the extended liability 
standard explained above. Such a disincentive to corporate engagement, as 
well as investment, would have the potential to harm the economic 
development of these host states.122 In general, unlike ‘Western’ states, which 
replied to the OHCHR’s ‘Note Verbale’ on the Norms123 by emphasising their 
general disapproval of the document, the developing states tended to remain 
silent and, apart from Cuba, did not respond to the issue of the Norms 
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directly.124 Cuba, as an exception, supported the Norms as a ‘welcomed 
progressive development of international law’.125 
Western states voiced concern that shifting responsibility for the 
implementation of human rights standards to corporations would dilute the 
primary responsibility of states as legislators of international law.126 The 
United Kingdom argued for a framework containing ‘a universally accepted 
collation and clarification of the minimum standards of behaviour expected of 
companies with regard to human rights’.127 The Australian Government held  
the firm view that legal responsibility for the implementation of 
international human rights standards rests primarily with those States who 
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are party to the standards, not individual businesses. Businesses are obliged 
to comply with the laws of the countries in which they operate.128  
The Canadian Government recognised that ‘companies have an important role 
to play in the promotion and protection of human rights’, but emphasised the 
primary role of the states in this matter. It also expressed several concerns 
regarding the Norms — mainly that they purported to extend existing human 
rights obligations of states to TNCs; entrusted enforcement mechanisms, 
which may become ineffective, to non-state actors, which in turn could assist 
states in avoiding their human rights obligations; and changed the existing 
framework of obligations within the framework of international law.129 The 
United States went even further by claiming that the Norms were not based on 
existing legal frameworks, that they were ‘doomed from the outset’ and that 
the international community should rather focus on assisting states to 
implement their human rights obligations and enforce national law.130 
Moreover, they claimed that the Norms represented a significant divergence 
from the existing frameworks of international law by attempting to impose 
duties and obligations on non-state actors, while these were applicable solely 
to states.131  
There was also some anxiety that the Norms would make TNCs both a subject 
and a source of international law, thus obliterating traditional boundaries of 
international law.132 Of particular interest was the response of the United 
States, which began by reiterating the US position that the Norms 
have no status — legal or otherwise. Not only was this exercise beyond the 
mandate of the Sub-Commission — but it was undertaken wholly without 
consideration for the views of the States.  
The United States also refuted the claim that TNCs were responsible for 
widespread human rights abuses in countries where they operate, claiming 
that such abuses were the result of ‘action or inaction of States’. The United 
States further alleged that the international community should focus on 
promoting and enforcing the rule of law by governments and not on ‘a 
drafting exercise geared toward creating “norms” out of whole cloth’.133 
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These adverse views seriously impacted on the views of other UN Member 
States when the Norms were considered for adoption by the Commission at its 
60th session in 2004. Further work on the norms was consequently put on 
hold. Later, the OHCHR issued a statement thanking the Sub-Commission for 
drafting the Norms, confirming the overall importance of the subject, and at 
the same time clarifying that the draft proposal had no legal status, and 
therefore the Sub-Commission should not perform any monitoring functions 
regarding the Norms.134 Subsequently, the Norms were effectively abandoned 
by the Commission on Human Rights in its 61st session in 2005, in line with 
the approach led by the United States and Australia. The Commission 
recommended that the UN General Secretary should appoint a Special 
Representative to review the whole matter of corporations and human 
rights.135 Consequently, in July 2005, Harvard Professor John Ruggie was 
appointed as the Special Representative to the UN Secretary General.136 
In their present form, the Norms have no binding force in international law. 
The Sub-Commission which drafted the Norms was not mandated to create 
binding new international law. At present, there is no international treaty 
which incorporates the Norms, nor is there evidence of any evolving state 
practice indicating the development of customary international law to that 
effect. Moreover, as mentioned above, the Commission itself stated that the 
Norms should have no legally binding effect. However, already existing 
principles of customary international law which were restated in the Norms 
retain their force as independent principles of international law.137  
VI THE NORMS AND RUGGIE’S ‘PROTECT, RESPECT AND 
REMEDY’ FRAMEWORK  
One cannot avoid reassessing the value and the potential of the Norms in light 
of the newly endorsed Guiding Principles and the ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ framework developed by Ruggie. Despite the fact that Ruggie 
distanced himself from the Norms, there were two important lessons learnt 
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from the process of drafting the Norms: firstly that any future legal document 
governing the sensitive issue of business and human rights had to be 
acceptable to all affected stakeholders and had to avoid creating a framework 
of hard law rules. A more thorough analysis of the Guiding Principles, 
however, suggests that the difference between the two documents is only a 
matter of nuance and that their principles, while constituting clearly non-
binding ‘soft law’, may eventually lead to the future development of 
recognised ‘hard law’.138 
Ruggie, the SRSG, went to great lengths to dissociate his work from the 
original Norms. He harshly criticised the Norms in a 2006 report to the 
Human Rights Council, a criticism referred to by some commentators as the 
‘death knell’ for the Norms.139 While the SRSG appraised the content of the 
Norms as such, he emphasised the flaws in their nature and form. He claimed 
that the two most problematic aspects of the Norms were the legal authority 
envisaged for them and the proposed sharing of human rights responsibilities 
between states and businesses. Ruggie essentially argued that the Norms, 
while on the one hand creating a new body of international law that addressed 
corporations directly, were at the same time lacking definition when 
elaborating on joint obligations which were shared by states and 
corporations.140 The SRSG wrote that the Norms could not simultaneously 
merely reflect existing international law and, be directly binding upon 
corporations. This would in effect be breaking with generally accepted 
principles of international law, which do not grant international legal 
personality to corporations. (The possible exception to this principle is the 
arguable responsibility of corporations, in certain circumstances, for aiding 
and abetting breaches of jus cogens human rights and the law of armed 
conflict). Ruggie further argued that the Norms failed to differentiate between 
the responsibilities of states and those of businesses according to their 
respective social roles and duties. This argument was linked to the observation 
that this might lead to a situation where the duty to protect human rights might 
fall entirely upon corporations, hence enabling states to avoid their own 
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responsibilities. This is a development which can be witnessed already today 
in the context of CSR in the developing world: MNCs take on the role of the 
host nation in respect to the provision of basic social services. Ruggie 
observed this possibility in light of the legal discussion surrounding the term 
‘spheres of influence’, a concept which he considered to have no legal 
pedigree. He therefore concluded that the Norms should be abandoned 
altogether rather than followed.141  
Ruggie’s approach was criticised by the civil society proponents of the Norms 
who believed that the SRSG’s focus should have been on developing the 
Norms rather than on abandoning them.142 Weissbrodt criticised Ruggie for a 
potential corporate bias, stating that the SRSG’s critique of the Norms was 
‘inspired, if not copied word for word, from the advocacy of the International 
Chamber of Commerce and the International Organization of Employers’.143  
Different views were expressed by various states. Argentina, for example, was 
worried that the Norms weakened the social capabilities of states in regard to 
human and social rights. Liechtenstein, on the other hand, applauded the 
SRSG for his approach of ‘principled pragmatism’ which succeeded where 
the Norms had failed.144 
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While the Norms were supposed to increase corporate responsibility for 
human rights compliance through the introduction, implementation and 
enforcement of binding human rights principles, thus following an 
enforcement approach, Ruggie’s framework follows the management 
approach.145 While the Norms focused on the benefits and harm that 
corporations can cause, the SRSG focuses solely on the potential benefits of 
the corporate presence in the state that hosts its business operations. His 
approach emphasises the importance of good corporate governance, as 
‘markets work optimally only if they are embedded within rules, customs and 
institutions’.146 Ruggie argues that history shows that the greatest dangers 
from corporations come from those that are beyond the reach of the 
institutional underpinning.147 
This doctrinal and normative difference between the Norms and Ruggie’s 
framework is the most apparent difference between the two frameworks. 
While the essential rules and principles set up in the Norms have remained the 
same in Ruggie’s framework, their nature, impact and format have changed. 
Whereas the drafters of the Norms were content with a declaration reiterating 
the central role of states in the protection of human rights, Ruggie has stressed 
this role as a key principle in order to prevent states from delegating the 
burden of human rights protection to corporations. Ruggie has chosen to limit 
the range of specific human rights responsibilities applicable to corporations, 
while reiterating the view that there exists an overall responsibility to respect 
virtually all internationally recognised human rights. In essence, Ruggie has 
chosen to implement all the rules of the Norms by adopting Article 10 of the 
Norms — namely the responsibility of business enterprises to respect human 
rights in general. He has therefore adopted the normative background of the 
Norms as his own approach. This conceptual amendment and adaptation has 
enabled states and the business community to accept the new principles.  
Despite the fact that both the drafters of the Norms and the SRSG included 
various stakeholders in the drafting process, the impact of, and recognition 
given to, the various groups of contributors differed. The drafters of the 
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Norms aimed at creating a document that would define legally the duties of 
business enterprises in relation to human rights, and therefore focused on the 
opinions of academic scholars and civil society. Ruggie’s strategic choice was 
to create a framework acceptable to businesses and states. Consequently, he 
included these actors in the drafting process, considering them crucial and 
fundamental for its success, while limiting the role and importance of 
representatives from civil society.  
In conclusion, it can be submitted that work on both frameworks has turned 
out to be interconnected: the Norms set the high normative standard which 
laid down the groundwork for Ruggie’s eventual success in promoting his 
Guidelines as a widely acceptable framework. 
VII CONCLUSION 
This article has discussed the question of why the Norms ultimately failed to 
win the approval of the UN Commission on Human Rights. It suggests that 
the eventual abandoning of the Norms was caused by a number of factors, 
which centred on the potential effects of the framework of the Norms, rather 
than only their substance. These reasons are well documented in the 
reservations and the criticism raised by states and representatives of the 
business community. The main criticisms were: that the Norms subjected 
TNCs to direct obligations under international law without the express 
consent of the states; that existing human rights instruments were 
overstretched by their application directly to TNCs; that the Norms were non-
voluntary; that they disempowered the states and enlarged the legal role of 
corporations; that they were vague; and that they contained allegedly 
ineffective anti-democratic enforcement mechanisms.  
In conclusion, it is submitted that the reasons for the failure of the Norms can 
be generally divided into three groups. Firstly, the novel character and the 
large scope of new legal concepts within the framework of the Norms broke 
with traditional roles of subjects under international law. They thus enabled 
states and business organisations to claim that the Norms were contrary to the 
positivist foundations of international law. Secondly, the scope of the Norms 
went too far in blurring the distinction between public and private law 
frameworks, therefore giving room to the argument that the new concepts 
countermanded the fundamental role of the state as legislator. Finally, the 
legal vagueness of the Norms and the contradictions within the Norms assisted 
the case against their endorsement and led to their eventual dismissal. Some 
of these crucial faults of the Norms should be further emphasised. A central 
issue was the planned degrading of states as the main subjects of international 
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law, by a curtailment of their legislative sovereignty and authority. Vázquez 
observed that the Norms created a framework which promoted a factual 
disempowerment of the states.148 The factors motivating TNCs and other non-
state actors to comply with the Norms may differ from those motivating 
states, and TNCs’ interests may even be at odds with the interests of states: 
business operations may follow different rules from the operations of states. 
Vázquez also observed that violations of international law of the kind found in 
the Norms may have a jurisgenerative effect, and therefore we should abandon 
the norms which should still be developed free from any rigid enforcement 
mechanism and only use such mechanisms with clear norms that are not to be 
changed.149 
As mentioned, the Norms blurred the line between public and private law, and 
moved in the direction of transnational law, by elevating TNCs to subjects of 
international law. In that they went further than other initiatives dealing with 
the relations between business and human rights. Backer believed that the 
Norms treated the TNCs as subjects of international law, rather than as 
objects, a significant modification which altered the regulatory power between 
state and non-state actors.150 This character of the Norms was largely resisted 
by states. The UK submitted a document to the OHCHR stating that  
[a]ny ongoing process should not seek to place companies in the same 
position as States with regard to obligations in international human rights 
law. To avoid confusion of their legal status, texts relating to the 
responsibilities of business with regard to human rights should not use 
legally-binding treaty language.151  
Perhaps the main reason that the Norms were opposed so fiercely by a wide 
coalition of critics was that they ‘touched the heart of the matter’. They 
questioned the very essence of the state-centred doctrine152 through imposing 
direct legal obligations on TNCs and structuring a role for TNCs that 
bypassed the states and subjected them to supranational regulation monitored 
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through non-state enforcement mechanisms. The Norms were different from 
all other frameworks intended to deal with the business and human rights 
relationship; they were not just moderate adjustments of the inefficient system 
of state regulation of TNCs. They tried to use the international legal 
framework as a basis for private law making. This was an attempt to rejoin the 
public and private legal systems into a single framework of transnational law, 
similar to the frameworks that existed prior to the Peace of Westphalia. Such a 
significant alteration of the framework of international law would represent a 
crucial divergence from the exclusive, state-monopolised international legal 
system to an inclusive transnational system with various legal subjects. This 
change was well understood by the (mainly Western) states, an understanding 
reflected in their extreme criticism of the project.  
One can compare the introduction of the Norms into the ruling paradigm of 
voluntary initiatives — a paradigm which maintains the state-centred order — 
with an alternative, presented at the time, of what Kuhn relates to as ‘normal 
science’.153 This brings us to the wider question posed at the beginning of this 
article: whether there was a possibility of creating ‘hard law’ in the 
framework of international law, to regulate the relations between business and 
human rights. If we adhere to Kuhn’s view, then the situation must become a 
crisis before there will be a destructive-constructive paradigm change. It 
seems that reality confirms this assumption. One of the key objections to the 
Norms was that they were more than the ‘soft law’ document that their 
drafters presented them as. Neither the business community, nor most of the 
states were ready to accept the creation of binding international law regulating 
corporations, which would not only bypass the states but which would attempt 
to coerce them from below. These objections, however, may be the result of 
the joining of various (over-) ambitious intentions in the Norms, and may not 
necessarily predict the failure of all future ‘hard law’ initiatives. There are 
indications that the Norms went too far, but they may have suggested a 
solution to a problem that would otherwise have remained unanswered. 
Perhaps, as Kuhn would predict, there needs to be a new ‘crisis’ — an 
extreme situation that clarifies the failure of the current voluntary and self-
regulating frameworks — in order for the new paradigm to be advanced.  
The question of the failure of the Norms should therefore be limited to their 
formal scope. On a normative level, the Norms may turn out to be (at least) a 
partial success. Despite the failure of not having become binding law, the 
Norms created a significant impact on stakeholders at the non-state level. 
Investment institutions began applying the Norms to persuade companies to 
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improve their social responsibility; NGOs began using the Norms as a basis 
for their advocacy of corporate social responsibility; companies have 
expressed general support for the Norms, while others even began ‘road-
testing’ the Norms.154 Perhaps, after all, the Norms are fulfilling the role 
designed for them, even if they were not adopted officially. Despite being 
considered the less preferred alternative by the corporations, they have 
certainly turned out to be one of the fundamental building blocks of the new 
UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework. Rule suggested that the 
Norms were designed to stimulate societal change rather than to become a 
binding legal document, and that they should therefore be read as relating to 
an ideal structure of de lege ferenda regarding the connection between 
business and human rights.155 Backer argued that the Norms were constructed 
so as to have a certain constitutional dimension on a supra-national level.156 
One can conclude by endorsing the view of Baxi, who said that the more 
successful attempts to legislate have often been the ones where the original 
ambitions constituted legal utopias ‘de lege ferenda’, which managed to 
transform existing legal and factual frameworks.157 
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